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Children’s Memory for Conversations 
About Sexual Abuse:  Legal and 
Psychological Implications 
Thomas D. Lyon* & Stacia N. Stolzenberg** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal and psychological literature on children’s testimony 
in child sexual abuse cases has largely focused on whether 
children are allowed to testify, how children testify, and what 
happens after they do. Those concerned about false convictions 
have emphasized the benefits of mechanisms to exclude children’s 
testimony that is unreliable because of pre-trial influence or 
developmental immaturity1 and the utility of expert testimony on 
children’s suggestibility.2  Those concerned about false acquittals 
have argued for eliminating barriers to receiving children’s 
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 1.  See, e.g., Laurie Shanks, Evaluating Children’s Competency to 
Testify: Developing a Rational Method to Assess a Young Child’s Capacity to 
Offer Reliable Testimony in Cases Alleging Sexual Abuse, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
575, 580–81, 593–94 (2010).  
 2.  See, e.g., Livia L. Gilstrap, Kristina Fritz, Amanda Torres, & Annika 
Melinder, Child Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the 
Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59, 71–73 (2005); Julie A. 
Buck, Kamala London & Daniel B. Wright, Expert Testimony Regarding 
Child Witnesses:  Does it Sensitize Jurors to Forensic Interview Quality?, 35 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 152, 153 (2011). 
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testimony,3 the benefits of setting up special devices (such as 
screens or closed-circuit television) for receiving testimony,4 and 
the utility of expert testimony on child sexual abuse 
accommodation.5  Both sides of the debate have emphasized the 
extent to which children’s reports are subject to adult influence.6  
Those skeptical of children’s abuse claims have emphasized the 
influence of suspicious adults and overzealous investigators, 
whereas those inclined to believe children’s reports have 
emphasized the influence of perpetrators (and the adults aligned 
with perpetrators).7 
There are two other adults whose influence over child 
witnesses has received less attention: the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney.  Despite the widespread calls for reform to the 
trial process, the most important evidence in the majority of child 
sexual abuse cases is still likely to be the child’s testimony in open 
court.  Given the expense and time necessary to retain experts, 
they are unlikely to testify in any more than a small minority of 
cases.8  Although child abuse prosecutions in other countries have 
been modified to accommodate children’s special needs, 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing the Competency of Child 
Witnesses: Best Practice Informed by Psychology and Law, in CHILDREN’S 
TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 69 
(Michael E. Lamb et al. eds., 2011). 
 4.  See, e.g., SUSAN R. HALL & BRUCE D. SALES, COURTROOM 
MODIFICATIONS FOR CHILD WITNESSES: LAW AND SCIENCE IN FORENSIC 
EVALUATIONS (2008); Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who 
Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child 
Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 253–56, 267–77 (2010); Sophia 
Rowlands, Cole’s Law Confronts Constitutional Issues: Expanding the 
Availability of Closed-Circuit Child Testimony in the Face of the 
Confrontation Clause, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 294, 295–96, 298 (2006). 
 5.  See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Litigation: Consensus and Confusion, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y, 1, 46–
48 (2010). 
 6.  See, e.g., Shanks, supra note 1; Gilstrap et al., supra note 2; see also 
Buck et al., supra note 2; Lyon, supra note 3. 
 7.  See Shanks, supra note 1; Gilstrap et al., supra note 2; Buck et al., 
supra note 2. 
 8.  For example, we examined final arguments in 189 cases of child 
sexual abuse and found that expert testimony for the prosecution explaining 
the dynamics of child sexual abuse was offered in only 9% of the cases. See, 
e.g., Stacia N. Stolzenberg & Thomas D. Lyon, Evidence Summarized in 
Attorney’s Closing Arguments Predicts Case Outcome in Criminal Trials of 
Sexual Abuse (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter 
Stolzenberg & Lyon, Evidence Summarized].  
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prosecutors in the United States tend to remain reliant on 
children’s testimony, usually eschewing special procedures that 
would prevent the jury from seeing the child live in court.9  This 
reliance is especially likely to continue given the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, which found 
that uncross-examined testimonial hearsay violates the 
confrontation rights of criminal defendants.10  Moreover, even in 
countries that have adopted quite radical reforms (at least by U.S. 
standards) such as substituting a videotaped forensic interview for 
children’s testimony, it is still thought to be important to allow the 
defense to cross-examine the child on the stand.11 
 Hence, the kinds of questions that children are asked in court 
by prosecutors and defense attorneys remain of central 
importance in assessing the outcome of criminal prosecutions in 
abuse cases.  A small but growing literature has examined 
attorney-child interactions in court. Two themes are predominant.  
The first concerns question types, mainly focusing on defense 
attorneys, and typically concluding that defense attorneys’ 
questions are more leading and linguistically more confusing than 
prosecutors’.12  It has long been known that leading questions can 
 
 9.   See John E.B. Myers, Allison D. Redlich, Gail S. Goodman, Lori P. 
Prizmich, Edward Imwinkelried, Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999).  
 10.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
 11.  See Rachel Zajac & Paula Cannan, Cross-examination of Sexual 
Assault Complainants: A Developmental Comparison, 16 PSYCHIATRY 
PSYCHOL. & LAW S36, S37 (2009); Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, The 
Negative Effect of Cross-Examination Style Questioning on Children’s 
Accuracy:  Older Children Are Not Immune, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
3 (2006) [hereinafter Zajac & Hayne, The Negative Effect of Cross-
Examination].  
 12.  See JUDY CASHMORE WITH NICOLA DE HAAS, THE USE OF CLOSED 
CIRCUIT TELEVISION FOR CHILD WITNESSES IN THE ACT. SYDNEY:  AUSTRALIAN 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION (1992); Emma Davies & Fred W. Seymour, 
Questioning Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse: Analysis of Criminal Court 
Transcripts in New Zealand, 5 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 47, 54–57 (2009); 
Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P. H. Jones, Patricia England, 
Linda K. Port, Leslie Rudy, Lydia Prado, John E.B. Myers & Gary B. Melton, 
Testifying in Criminal Court:  Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault 
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 80 (1992); Zajac & 
Cannan, supra note 11, at S47–S48; Rachel Zajac, Julien Gross and Harlene 
Hayne, Asked and Answered: Questioning Children in the Courtroom, 10 
PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 199, 206 (2003) [hereinafter Zajac et al., Asked 
and Answered]; but see Angela D. Evans, Kang Lee & Thomas D. Lyon, 
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undermine children’s reliability. With respect to linguistic 
difficulty, lab studies have shown that children err frequently and 
fail to ask for clarification.13  The second theme concerns 
attorneys’ case strategies, again focused on defense attorneys, 
with researchers emphasizing defense attorneys’ attempts to 
imply that children’s memories have been tainted or that children 
are dishonest.14  In a pioneering series of studies, Zajac and her 
colleagues have shown that cross-examinations combining 
complex and leading questions lead a large percentage of children 
to change their stories, thus reducing the reliability of their 
testimony.15 
This research makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of what occurs in the courtroom, but it is limited in 
several respects.  First, permissible and impermissible approaches 
are not distinguished.  Leading questions are routinely allowed on 
cross-examination in the United States and elsewhere, and 
defense attorneys in other jurisdictions are required to directly 
challenge child witnesses with their theories of the case.16  In 
contrast, many complex questions are objectionable, either on the 
generic grounds of being “vague” or “ambiguous” or on the grounds 
of statutes that specifically prohibit developmentally 
 
Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors Predict 
Convictions in Child Abuse Trials, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 258, 262 (2009); 
Kristen Hanna, Emma Davies, Charles Crothers and Emily Henderson, 
Questioning Child Witnesses in New Zealand’s Criminal Justice System: Is 
Cross-Examination Fair?, 19 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 530, 535 (2012).  
 13.  See Nancy W. Perry, Bradley D. McAuliff, Paulette Tam, Linda 
Claycomb, Colleen Dostal, & Cameron Flanagan, When Lawyers Question 
Children. Is Justice Served?, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 609, 625 (1995); Cathleen 
A. Carter, Bette L. Bottoms & Murray Levine, Linguistic and Socioemotional 
Influences on the Accuracy of Children's Reports, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 335, 
349 (1996).  
 14.  See Mark Brennan, The Battle For Credibility–Themes in the Cross 
Examination of Child Victim Witnesses, 7 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 51, 53–54 
(1994); Hanna, supra note 12, at 541; Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A. 
Lonsway, The Power of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of 
Child Sexual Abuse, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1415, 1424 (1998). 
 15.  See Rachel Zajac, Sarah O’Neill & Harlene Hayne, Disorder in the 
Courtroom? Child Witnesses Under Cross-Examination, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REV. 181, 186 (2012) [hereinafter Disorder in The Courtroom].  
 16.  Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, I Don’t Think That is Really What 
Happened:  The Effect of Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of Children’s 
Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 187, 191–93 (2003) 
[hereinafter Zajac & Harlene, I Don’t Think That is Really What Happened].  
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inappropriate questions.17 Second, problems with prosecutors’ 
questions are largely overlooked.  Prosecutors’ questions are often 
as complex as defense attorneys’.18  Although their questions are 
not as leading, they tend to be closed-ended,19 and are therefore 
less productive and more error-prone than open-ended questions.20  
Third, subtle difficulties may be overlooked.  For example, the 
complex questions studied in the lab tend to be obviously difficult, 
at least to adults.21  If the complexities are obvious, then greater 
vigilance on the part of judges and attorneys could solve the 
problems.  But if the problems are subtle, either special training is 
necessary or questioning should be taken out of the attorneys’ 
hands altogether.   
Furthermore, subtle problems are as likely to occur in the 
prosecutor’s direct examination as in the defense attorney’s cross-
examination, because prosecutors are less likely to evince 
deliberate attempts to change the child’s report.  Similarly, the 
challenges to children’s credibility assessed in this research are 
typically overt—questioners directly suggested to children that 
their reports were in error.  However, practice guides routinely 
suggest to defense attorneys that they undermine children’s 
reports through implying external sources of influence, rather 
than through overt challenges.22 
 
 17.  See Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and Imagination: Lying, 
Hypothetical Reasoning, and Referential Ambiguity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMAGINATION 126 (Marjorie Taylor ed., 
2013) (questions difficult for children could be objected to as “vague” or 
“ambiguous”), available at http://works.bepress.com/thomaslyon/77/; CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 765(b) (2004) (questions asked of children under ten years of 
age must be age-appropriate).   
 18.  See Evans et al., supra note 12, at 262; Hanna, supra note 12, at 541, 
Table 4 (defense attorneys tended to ask more complex questions than 
prosecutors, but the differences were statistically significant in only one 
comparison).  
 19.  See generally Stacia Stolzenberg & Thomas Lyon, How Attorneys 
Question Children about the Dynamics of Sexual Abuse and Disclosure in 
Criminal Trials, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 19 (2014).  
 20.  See MICHAEL E. LAMB, IRIT HERSHKOWITZ, YAEL ORBACH & PHILLIP W. 
ESPLIN, TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED:  STRUCTURED INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF 
CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 40 (Graham Davies & Ray Bull eds., 2008). 
 21.  See Perry et al., supra note 13, at 618–19; Carter et al., supra note 
13, at 337, 349. 
 22.  See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A 
Step in the Wrong Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 944–45 (1994); John E.B. 
Myers, Examining the Young Witness: Paint the Child into Your Corner, 10 
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In this paper we discuss a research program created to better 
understand the difficulties that child witnesses encounter when 
testifying about sexual abuse. We focus on a specific concern: 
children’s memory for conversations about sexual abuse.  This 
problem is often overlooked but likely to be extremely important 
in child sexual abuse trials, because both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys see adult influence as a major factor in understanding 
children’s allegations of sexual abuse. From a prosecutor’s 
perspective, it is important to educate the jury about the suspect’s 
ability to influence the child, both to acquiesce to sexual abuse and 
to remain silent about the abuse.  From a defense attorney’s 
perspective, it is important to sensitize the jury to the risks that 
interested parties have influenced the child’s report. Both 
perspectives will make the child’s conversational interactions with 
adults of central importance. 
From a legal perspective, one might assume that children’s 
conversations with others run afoul of the rule against hearsay.  
However, as we will demonstrate, this is a misconception, both 
because of the non-hearsay uses of out-of-court statements23 and 
the numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay.24  From a 
psychological perspective, asking children about conversations 
raises interesting and underexplored empirical issues. First, there 
is little research on adults’ recall of conversations, let alone 
research on children. Recall of conversations is likely to raise 
difficulties in source monitoring (that is, the process by which one 
recalls the source of information, such as where and when one 
first learned some fact).25  Therefore, to the extent that children 
are asked to recall specific conversations, their abilities may be 
 
FAM. ADVOC. 41, 42–43, 48 (1988).  
 23.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2011). 
 24.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807 (2011). 
 25.  See generally D. Stephen Lindsay, Marcia K. Johnson & Paul Kwon, 
Developmental Changes in Memory Source Monitoring, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CHILD PSYCHOL. 297, 314 (1991); Kim P. Roberts & Martine B. Powell, 
Describing Individual Incidents of Sexual Abuse: A Review of Research on the 
Effects of Multiple Sources of Information on Children’s Reports, 25 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1643, 1651–52 (2001); Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci, & 
Emmet Francoeur, The Accuracy of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations With 
Their Preschool Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89, 103–04 
(1999); Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay 
Testimony:  How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their Interviews With Children, 
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 355, 365–66 (1999).  
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taxed.  Second, children may not understand the implications of 
questions about conversations, and thus may be susceptible to 
questions that imply subtly that the child was coached.  Third, the 
language that is used to ask children about conversations is likely 
to provide difficulties. For example, whether a disclosure recipient 
“asked” or “told” the child matters much to the case, but there is 
evidence that the words are not well distinguished by young 
children.26 
In Section II, we describe how the hearsay rules allow for 
questions about conversations in child sexual abuse cases.  In 
Section III, we discuss how prosecutors seeking to explain the 
dynamics of sexual abuse to jurors should be motivated to ask 
children questions about conversations with suspects, and we 
describe the results of a study of court transcripts suggesting that 
prosecutors are not making optimal use of this strategy.27  In 
Section IV, we discuss how defense attorneys are likely to question 
children about their conversations with others to whom they 
disclosed their abuse (disclosure recipients) as a means of 
suggesting adult influence.  Again, we describe the results of a 
court transcript study, and we find evidence that defense 
attorneys are indeed pursuing this strategy.28  However, we also 
show that prosecutors are also asking many questions about 
conversations with disclosure recipients, and that both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys often ask specific questions that 
are likely very difficult for children to answer correctly.  
Furthermore, we show that overt allegations of coaching or lying 
by defense attorneys are infrequent, which suggests that their 
attacks on children’s credibility are subtler.  In Section V, we 
discuss the linguistic difficulties presented by questions about 
conversations and focus on children’s difficulty in distinguishing 
between “ask” and “tell,” describing research we have conducted 
examining court transcripts and assessing children’s 
understanding in the lab.29 Section VI concludes with 
 
 26.  See Anne Graffam Walker, Handbook on Questioning Children:  A 
Linguistic Perspective, 2 ABA CENTER ON CHILD. & L. 1, 29 (1999).  
 27.  See Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 2, 18.  
 28.  See id. at 7, 22.  
 29.  The research we discuss, infra Section V(c), was recently presented 
at the American Psychology and Law Society Annual Conference.  See Stacia 
N. Stolzenberg, Thomas D. Lyon, Christen Phillips, and Jennifer Mascia, She 
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recommendations for legal practitioners and the courts in asking 
child witnesses questions about conversations. 
II. THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S CONVERSATIONS IN 
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
At first glance, one might expect there to be little discussion of 
conversations in child sexual abuse trials because of the rule 
against hearsay.  Informally, a hearsay problem arises whenever a 
witness refers to what someone (including the witness) has said.  
Technically, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.30  The law expects that cases be 
proven through witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the 
dispute at issue.  When this occurs, those witnesses’ potential 
infirmities—insincerity, misperception, memory failure, and 
ambiguous narration—can be tested by the trial process.  
Witnesses take the oath (which is intended to make them more 
honest or sincere), and they are subject to direct- and cross-
examination, by which their perception, memory, and narration 
can be tested.  When a witness quotes another person (an out-of-
court declarant), the hearsay problem arises: the out-of-court 
declarant is not under oath and cannot be cross-examined.31 
Because of the rules against hearsay, one might assume that 
the child witness will be asked to describe the abuse she suffered 
and nothing more.  However, many out-of-court statements are 
not considered hearsay, because they are not “offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.”32  For example, when a plaintiff in a 
slander case testifies that the defendant said, “You are a 
scoundrel,” he is not offering the out-of-court statement to prove 
its truth, and the statement would never be called hearsay.33  If 
the statement is relevant simply because it was said (and 
 
Told me, ‘What Happened?’” Young Children’s Misuse of the Verbs “Ask” and 
“Tell” in the Lab and in Court, American Psychology and Law Society Annual 
Conference, New Orleans, LA (2014).  
 30.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 (4th ed. 2009) (forty-two states have 
adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules).  
 31.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:3.  Technically, even 
if the witness quotes herself, this is also hearsay, as long as the statement is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.   
 32.  FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 33.  Id.  
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regardless of its truth), then it is non-hearsay.34  Furthermore, 
there are a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
In sexual abuse trials, many out-of-court statements will be 
admissible despite the rule against hearsay.  Although they fall 
within the definition of hearsay, the prosecutor can offer any 
statements by a criminal defendant as “an opposing party’s 
statement.”35  Therefore, when the prosecutor calls the child to the 
stand, any statement the child recalls hearing the suspect say is 
admissible.36  The rationale is that the defendant is in court and is 
free to explain any statements he may have made (i.e., he cannot 
complain that he is unable to cross-examine himself).  
Furthermore, many of the suspect’s statements, such as threats, 
would not even be considered hearsay, since they are often offered 
for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the effects of the words 
spoken on the child (e.g. compliance or secrecy).37  Therefore, the 
prosecutor can ask a child about her interactions with the suspect 
both before and after the alleged abuse, making it easy to elicit 
reports of preparation before the abuse and efforts to keep the 
abuse a secret. The suspect’s statements can also prove sexual 
intent; for example, if the suspect has told the child to keep the 
touching a secret, this makes it unlikely that the touching 
constituted appropriate caretaking.38 
A number of hearsay exceptions enable the prosecutor to 
introduce disclosures of abuse by the child.  These statements can 
be elicited from the child or, more commonly, from anyone who 
heard the child’s statement.  One hearsay exception is for excited 
utterances, which in the classic case involves a report of abuse 
shortly after the abuse occurred and while the child is upset by 
the abuse.39  The exception has been expansively interpreted so 
that both the temporal requirement and the excitement 
 
 34.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:18.  
 35.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).   
 36.  See id.  
 37.  See JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE, CHILD MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, RAPE, 
STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE § 7.08 (2013). 
 38.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 11165.1 (West 1987) (stating that the 
statutory definition of sexual abuse “does not include acts which may 
reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities”).  
 39.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2); MYERS, supra note 37, § 7.13. 
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requirement are relaxed in child abuse cases.40  Another hearsay 
exception is for statements made for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis or treatment, which will cover many statements made 
by the child to medical personnel, and to non-medical persons if 
the child was motivated by a desire to receive care.41  This 
exception has also been broadened, although its use for the child’s 
identification of a perpetrator and for statements made to mental 
health professionals is controversial.42  Finally, most states have 
adopted special hearsay exceptions for children’s complaints of 
abuse.43  These provisions vary, but common requirements limit 
the statements to complaints of abuse by younger children 
(typically pre-teens).44 
If the child fails to testify altogether, concern for the 
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses will place 
limits on the kinds of hearsay from the child that can be admitted; 
if the child’s statements constituted “testimonial hearsay,” they 
are inadmissible.45  “Testimonial hearsay” is still being defined, 
but has been applied by many courts to formal questioning of the 
child by law enforcement, by child protective services in many (if 
not most) circumstances, and by forensic interviewers at child 
advocacy centers.46  It is important to remember, however, that if 
the child testifies, the constitutional objection to admissibility of 
any hearsay from the child disappears.47 
A number of hearsay exceptions (and non-hearsay use of 
statements) apply to concerns about the consistency or 
inconsistency of a child’s reports with the child’s testimony.  A 
child’s prior statements that are consistent with the child’s 
 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  FED. R. EVID. 803(4); MYERS, supra note 37, § 7.15.  
 42.  Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the 
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47–49 (2002). 
 43.  See, e.g., THOMAS GARDNER & TERRY ANDERSON, EVIDENCE:  
PRINCIPLES AND CASES 174 (7th ed. 2009); Glen Skoler, New Hearsay 
Exceptions for a Child’s Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 
(1984).  
 44.  NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 369–70 (3d ed. 2004). 
 45.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). 
 46.  See Thomas D. Lyon & Julia Dente, Child Witnesses and the 
Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1183 (2012). 
 47.  See id. 
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testimony may be admissible under the prior consistent 
statements hearsay exception.48  The exception typically requires, 
however, that those statements in some way rebut a claim of 
fabrication or influence, and they can do so by having occurred 
prior to the time that something influenced the child to falsify her 
story.49  For example, if the defense argues that the police’s 
suggestive questioning influenced the child’s report, then the 
child’s disclosure to a friend before the police were notified could 
be admissible as a prior consistent statement.  It is also possible 
for prior consistent statements to be admitted as non-hearsay 
rehabilitation.  The rationale is that the consistency between the 
prior statement and the child’s current testimony rebuts the 
attack on the child’s testimony.50  For example, if the defense 
suggests through cross-examination that the child does not recall 
the original event, then the prosecutor could introduce the child’s 
prior consistent statements (made closer in time to the event) to 
argue that the consistency rebuts the attack on the child’s 
memory. 
Another hearsay exception applies to a child’s statements that 
are inconsistent with that child’s testimony.  Some states require 
these prior statements to have been made under oath, which 
would essentially limit them to preliminary hearing testimony.51  
Furthermore, prior inconsistent statements can also be offered as 
non-hearsay impeachment. The rationale is that the prior 
statements are not offered for their truth, but to show that the 
child makes inconsistent claims and therefore should not be 
believed generally.52  The prosecution and defense will use prior 
inconsistencies differently.  The prosecution might seek to admit 
prior inconsistent statements if a child recants some or all of her 
disclosure on the stand.  The defense is likely to use prior 
inconsistencies to argue that the child is lying on the stand, or 
that her story is the product of suggestion.  The rationale is that a 
 
 48.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (2011). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (advisory committee 
notes).  
 51.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).  But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (not 
requiring that prior inconsistent statements have been under oath at a 
proceeding). 
 52.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8:17.  
LYON_AND_STOLZENBERG_FINALWORD_UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/14  11:32 AM 
422 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:411 
child whose report is inconsistent over multiple disclosures is 
unlikely to be true. 
Because many statements made out of court can be admitted 
under a hearsay exception or offered for a non-hearsay purpose, it 
should not be surprising that children may be asked many 
questions about conversations when they testify.  However, it is 
important to note that the conversations can be admitted through 
any person who heard the statements.53  Therefore, although it 
would probably be necessary to ask the child about many of the 
suspect’s statements (because they would be made in private and 
because the suspect would not admit having made them), the 
child’s conversations with other adults could be elicited through 
the adults’ testimonies rather than the child’s. Prosecutors 
concerned with children’s limited memory and linguistic skills 
might be inclined to avoid asking child witnesses questions about 
specific aspects of their abuse disclosures, whereas defense 
attorneys hoping to undermine children’s credibility might direct 
most of their questions to the child.  Therefore, one is likely to see 
differences in the kinds of questions that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys ask children about their prior conversations. 
We recently completed the first study to examine how child 
witnesses are questioned about their conversations.  We reviewed 
seventy-two transcripts of six- to sixteen-year-old child witnesses 
testifying to child sexual abuse in Los Angeles County criminal 
cases.54  We were interested in whether defense attorneys and 
prosecutors did what a reading of the dynamics of sexual abuse 
disclosures would suggest that they would do: Do prosecutors ask 
questions focusing on conversations with suspects, in which 
suspects cajole children into sexual acts and then threaten them 
not to disclose?  Do defense attorneys ask questions focusing on 
prior disclosures as a means of identifying external influences on 
children’s reports? 
 
 53.  FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 54.  See Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19. 
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III. PROSECUTORS’ QUESTIONS ABOUT CHILDREN’S CONVERSATIONS 
WITH SUSPECTS:  EXPLAINING THE DYNAMICS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 
A.  The Relevance of Children’s Conversations from the 
Prosecution’s Perspective 
From the prosecutorial perspective, the unique dynamics of 
sexual abuse—including abuse by an adult close to the child, 
grooming behavior, and inducements to secrecy—lead children to 
report abuse only reluctantly and often inconsistently.55  
Prosecutors will often attempt to explain how the suspect 
accomplished abuse without the use of force, because the jury may 
envision abuse as akin to violent rape.56  It is also important to 
explain why the victim kept the abuse a secret for a lengthy period 
of time, because the jury may perceive delayed disclosure as 
evidence that the allegation was fabricated.57  Although jurors 
recognize that delayed disclosure is commonplace,58 they are more 
likely to believe children when disclosure occurs soon after the 
alleged abuse and when the child’s disclosure does not change over 
time.59 
Because of their pre-existing relationship with the child and 
their grooming methods, perpetrators need not use force in order 
to accomplish abuse or to guarantee the child’s silence.  In most 
sexual abuse cases, the suspect is familiar to the child, often a 
close relative.60  The relationship gives the perpetrator access to 
the child and allows the perpetrator to capitalize on the child’s 
 
 55.   See Jennifer Long, John Wilkinson & Julie Kays, 10 Strategies for 
Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse at the Hands of a Family Member, 
STRATEGIES: THE PROSECUTORS’ NEWSLETTER ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 
Sept. 2011, at 2.  
 56.   KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 
FOR PROFESSIONALS INVESTIGATING THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 
139 (5th ed. 2010).  
 57.   Long et al., supra note 55, at 2.  
 58.   See ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 164 (1993). 
 59.   See John A. Yozwiak, Jonathan M. Golding & D.F. Marsil, The 
Impact of Type of Out-of-Court Disclosure in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 9 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 325, 330 (2004).  
 60.  See Tina B. Goodman-Brown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of 
Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 530 
(2003); see also BARBARA E. SMITH & SHARON ELSTEIN, THE PROSECUTION OF 
CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE 30–32 (1993).  
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trust.  The closeness of the relation increases the likelihood of 
delay.61  Research that questions perpetrators about their modus 
operandi reveals how perpetrators actively develop trust, 
compliance, and silence.62  For example, Kaufman and colleagues 
interviewed 228 perpetrators, who reported that over time they 
would increasingly talk about sex, encourage children to wear less 
clothing, and tell children that they would “teach them something” 
before engaging in sexual acts.63  The progressive nature of the 
abuse enabled perpetrators to assess the risk of disclosure before 
the sexual behavior became overt, so that any disclosures could be 
explained as innocent or misinterpreted.64  Once overt sexual acts 
occurred, children would be deterred from disclosing because the 
earlier acts made them feel as if they had consented and led them 
to fear that they would be blamed for failing to complain.65 
Perpetrators sometimes overtly threaten children not to 
disclose the abuse.  In 27–33% of criminal cases, children recalled 
overt threats.66  According to Smith and Elstein, 
[W]arnings ranged from pleas that the abuser would get 
into trouble if the child told (or that the abuser would be 
sent away and the child would never see them again—a 
powerful message to a young child whose abuser is also a 
‘beloved’ parent), to threats that the child would be 
blamed for the abuse (especially troubling were children 
who were told that the defendant’s intimate—the child’s 
mother—would blame the child for ‘having sex’ with the 
defendant and would thus turn against him or her), to 
ominous warnings that the defendant would hurt or kill 
 
 61.  LOUISE DEZWICK SAS & ALISON HATCH CUNNINGHAM, TIPPING THE 
BALANCE TO TELL THE SECRET:  THE PUBLIC DISCOVERY OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
24 (1995), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ 
cornwall/en/hearings/exhibits/Peter_Jaffe/pdf/Tipping.pdf. 
 62.  Benoit Leclerc, Jean Proulx & Eric Beauregard, Examining the 
Modus Operandi of Sexual Offenders Against Children and its Practical 
Implications, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 5 (2009). 
 63.  Keith L. Kaufman et al., Factors Influencing Offenders’ Modus 
Operandi:  An Examination of Victim-Offender Relatedness and Age, 3 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 349, 353 (1998). 
 64.  See Reuben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex Offenders Lure 
Children, 1 ANNALS OF SEX RESEARCH 303, 308 (1988). 
 65.  See Kaufman et al., supra note 63, at 350–55.  
 66.  See GRAY, supra note 58, at 90; SMITH & ELSTEIN supra note 60, at 
93.  
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the child (or someone he or she loved) if they revealed the 
abuse.67 
Perpetrators themselves have described how they discourage 
children from disclosing.68  They emphasize the way in which 
disclosure will lead the child to lose positive factors in the child’s 
life, such as love, affection, friendship, and family stability.69  For 
example, in a criminal sample of convicted offenders of child 
sexual abuse, 33% of offenders specifically told their victims not to 
tell and an additional 20% of offenders reported having threatened 
loss of love or said the that child was to blame to maintain abuse 
and discourage disclosure.70  Conte and colleagues similarly found 
that perpetrators encouraged silence by telling victims that “their 
friends wouldn’t like them anymore,” their mom might be mad, or 
just by generally advising the child to “be careful not to tell 
anyone.”71 
The efficacy of perpetrators’ methods is demonstrated by 
delays in disclosure. Criminal samples reveal that children 
typically delay disclosure until multiple instances of abuse have 
occurred, with one-third of children waiting at least a year.72  In 
addition, children are capable of describing their reasons for 
failing to disclose.  Sas and Cunningham interviewed 135 children 
after prosecution and found that the most common reasons for 
delaying disclosure were:  (a) fear of harm to self or others, (b) fear 
of being rejected by a non-abusive caregiver, (c) concern for family 
and thinking that non- or delaying disclosure might protect 
family, (d) fear that their disclosure would not be believed, (e) 
concern that bad consequences will harm the perpetrator, (f) 
inability to trust anyone to disclose to, and (g) wanting to protect 
 
 67.  SMITH & ELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 93.  
 68.  See Michelle Elliot et al., Child Sexual Abuse Prevention: What 
Offenders Tell Us, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 579, 586 (1995); see also 
Stephen W. Smallbone & Richard K. Wortley, Child Sexual Abuse:  Offender 
Characteristics and Modus Operandi, AUSTL. INSTIT. OF CRIMINOLOGY:  
TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIMINAL JUST., Feb. 2001, at 5.  
 69.  See Lang & Frenzel, supra note 64, at 311–12; Smallbone & Wortley, 
supra note 68, at 5; SMITH & ELSTEIN supra note 60, at 93. 
 70.  See Elliott et al., supra note 68, at 582–86. 
 71.  Jon R. Conte, Steven Wolf, & Tim Smith, What Sexual Offenders Tell 
Us About Prevention Strategies, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 297–98 
(1989). 
 72.  See SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 27. 
LYON_AND_STOLZENBERG_FINALWORD_UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/14  11:32 AM 
426 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:411 
other children, including siblings, from abuse.73 
These findings suggest that, from the prosecutorial 
perspective, much can be understood about the dynamics of abuse 
by inquiring into what the suspect has said to the child, both to 
reveal grooming and to uncover any admonishments against 
disclosure.74  Furthermore, it is likely that the child will have 
delayed disclosing the abuse, and it is worthwhile to explore the 
reasons for that delay in order to help the jury understand.  
Indeed, prosecutors are advised to explore the dynamics of 
abuse,75 and the courts have been receptive to efforts to educate 
juries about the reasons behind children’s delays and 
inconsistencies.76 
B.  What Prosecutors Actually Do In Court 
As we noted above, we reviewed the testimony of seventy-two 
six- to sixteen-year-old child witnesses testifying to child sexual 
abuse in Los Angeles County criminal cases.77  Initially, it is 
worth noting that attorneys gave children little opportunity to 
answer in their own words.78  Although the defense attorneys 
were more inclined to ask overtly suggestive questions than 
prosecutors, a majority of both prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ 
questions could be answered simply “yes” or “no” (combining 
across yes-no questions, declarative questions, and suggestive 
questions).79  As a result, over 50% of children’s responses to 
attorneys’ questions were in fact unelaborated yes and no 
responses.  Furthermore, children virtually never spontaneously 
mentioned conversations; less than 1% of the question-answer 
pairs that mentioned a conversation were spontaneous reports by 
the children.80  Hence, children relied on the attorneys to develop 
details about their conversations. 
 
 73.  Id. at 27–28.  
 74.  See id.  
 75.  See Long et al., supra note 55, at 1–7.  
 76.  See generally MYERS, supra note 37, § 6.18 (citing cases which hold 
that expert testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate a child's credibility 
following impeachment focused on delayed reporting, inconsistency, or 
recantation”). 
 77.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19. 
 78.  See id. at 18. 
 79.  Id. at 12. 
 80.  Id. 
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We found that children were asked about conversations with 
suspects in virtually all (92%) of the trials.81  We classified 
perpetrator statements to the child as pertaining to commands 
during the abuse (i.e., giving the child instructions), seduction 
(statements encouraging the child to engage in sexual activity), 
silencing (attempts to keep the abuse a secret), and threats 
(references to the negative consequences of disclosure).  Not 
surprisingly, prosecutors were more likely to ask about commands 
and silencing than defense attorneys, and asked a larger number 
of questions about all four categories of suspect statements.82  We 
also analyzed children’s statements to the perpetrator, and 
considered whether those statements were protesting abuse.83  
Here, too, prosecutors were more likely than defense attorneys to 
ask about children’s statements.84 
However, prosecutors appeared to put more emphasis on the 
coercive aspects of the abusive acts than on suspects’ seductive 
preparation or efforts to keep the abuse a secret.85 Of those 
prosecution questions that referenced either commands or 
seduction, 75% referenced commands.86  Similarly, of prosecutors’ 
questions that asked about children’s statements, over 80% 
referenced protests.87  Furthermore, whereas prosecutors asked 
about perpetrator commands in a majority of the cases (71%), they 
asked about seduction (38%), silencing (36%), or threats (15%) in 
only a minority.88 
Prosecutors were also disinclined to ask children why they 
had disclosed or not disclosed abuse, asking each type of question 
in less than a third (31%) of trials.89  This was particularly curious 
because in 93% of the trials, child witnesses denied disclosing 
some information (90% of cases by the prosecution, 83% by the 
defense).90  On average, prosecutors elicited four denials per child, 
 
 81.  Id. at 13. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 37. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 15. 
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and defense attorneys seven.91  Hence, children were denying that 
they had disclosed information, but they were only infrequently 
asked to explain why. 
The greater emphasis on coercion was surprising, given both 
the emphasis on the seductive aspects of child molestation that is 
stressed in the literature and on legal commentator’s advice to 
prosecutors to emphasize the ways in which children 
accommodate abuse.92  One possibility we considered was whether 
the cases prosecuted are different than the cases discussed in the 
literature.  Indeed, there is evidence that prosecutors will weed 
out cases that are most likely to involve seduction and silencing 
rather than a single violent act of assault.93  Nevertheless, 
children knew the suspect in 92% of the cases (and accused a 
family member in 56%), and children in 70% of the cases alleged 
multiple instances of abuse.94  Force was charged in only 10% of 
the cases.95  These case characteristics strongly suggest that 
seduction and silencing played a significant role in accomplishing 
repeated abuse. 
This raises additional explanations for prosecutors’ emphasis 
on coercion.  Prosecutors may be unaware of the manipulative 
aspects of abuse.  Protocols for interviewing children focus on 
eliciting details about abuse96 and do not provide 
recommendations regarding questions about the behavior of the 
suspect with the child before abuse was initiated.  Therefore, 
prosecutors might receive cases without any information that 
would assist them in understanding the process by which the 
perpetrator molested the child over time.  Prosecutors might 
deliberately avoid questioning children about the seductive 
aspects of abuse, because of concerns regarding how juries would 
interpret such testimony.  Jurors may view molestation cases with 
seductive elements as less serious.  One study found that male 
mock jurors inquired into possible consent in cases involving 
children as young as twelve years of age.97 
 
 91.  Id. at 19. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See GRAY, supra note 58, at 114.  
 94.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 19–20. 
 95.  Id. at 10.  
 96.  LAMB ET AL., supra note 22. 
 97.  Peter K. Isquith, Murray Levine & Janine Scheiner, Blaming the 
Child:  Attribution of Responsibility to Victims of Child Sexual Abuse, in 
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We think it is likely that prosecutors are missing an 
opportunity to help jurors understand the dynamics of sexual 
abuse when they fail to inquire into the child’s relationship with 
the suspect before the abuse began and the ways in which the 
suspect maintained the child’s acquiescence to abuse over time.  If 
the prosecutor doesn’t ask, then jurors may be puzzled by the 
child’s reports of repeated abuse without any indication of outcry 
or resistance.  It seems particularly wrongheaded to fail to ask 
children for their reasons for disclosing and for delaying 
disclosure, because research has shown that children are capable 
of explaining their disclosure decisions.98  Since, as noted above, 
courts have been friendly toward expert testimony that explains to 
jurors why children delay disclosing,99 it seems sensible to ask 
children directly for their reasons. 
In our study examining seventy-two cases, we were not able to 
show that the kinds of questions prosecutors asked mattered to 
the verdict (though there was a hint: juries were marginally more 
likely to convict if the prosecution asked questions about motives 
for non-disclosure).100 However, in a larger sample, we found 
evidence that the common dynamics of sexual abuse made it more 
difficult to obtain a conviction:  jurors were much less likely to 
convict if force was not charged and if there was evidence that the 
child maintained contact with the suspect after the abuse 
allegedly occurred.101 This suggests that prosecutors should 
attempt to teach jurors that child sexual abuse is less like violent 
rape and more like ongoing and subtle manipulation. 
 
CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 203, 222–23 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. 
Bottoms eds., 1993).  
 98.  See, e.g., SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 27.  
 99.  See MYERS, supra note 37, at § 6.18 (citing cases which hold that 
expert testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate a child's credibility following 
impeachment focused on delayed reporting, inconsistency, or recantation”). 
 100.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 25. 
 101.  See Stolzenberg & Lyon, Evidence Summarized, supra note 8. 
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IV.  DEFENSE ATTORNEYS’ QUESTIONS ABOUT CHILDREN’S 
CONVERSATIONS WITH DISCLOSURE RECIPIENTS: EXPLAINING THE 
DYNAMICS OF SEXUAL ABUSE DISCLOSURE 
A.  The Relevance of Children’s Conversations from the Defense 
Perspective 
When children first disclose abuse, a chain of events is set 
into motion, including multiple formal and informal conversations 
with family members, medical professionals, and legal authorities.  
For those whose cases make it to criminal trials, children will 
have reported their abuse numerous times to various recipients 
over a lengthy period of time.  These factors present unique 
concerns regarding children’s ability to recall prior disclosure 
conversations.  One study found that sexually abused children 
received on average four formal interviews (e.g., with law 
enforcement, Department of Child and Family Services/social 
workers, medical or mental health professionals, and school 
personnel) and two informal interviews (e.g., with caregivers and 
relatives) in the course of dependency court proceedings.102  It is 
likely that children in criminal court proceedings experience still 
more interviews because of the longer delays before trial in 
criminal cases.  These contacts provide a basis for the defense to 
claim that the child’s report is the product of external influence. 
From the defense perspective, children are vulnerable to 
suggestion, and the fact that they have typically been questioned 
about abuse several times before trial makes it difficult to elicit 
the truth, as these pre-trial interviews and conversations may 
have altered the child’s report.103  The defense will often argue 
that the alleged victim is making a false report and will likely 
explore how others have exerted influence over the child, leading 
the child either to lie or to believe falsely that abuse occurred.  
Caregivers (and others close to the child) may be motivated to 
coach the child, and both caregivers and investigators may have 
strong suspicions of abuse that they communicate through 
 
 102.   Lindsay C. Malloy, Thomas D. Lyon & Jodi A. Quas, Filial 
Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 46 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD ADOLEC. PSYCHIATRY 162, 165 (2007).  
 103.   Kathleen B. Stilling, Developing the Defense in Child Sexual Assault 
Cases, 16 THE WISCONSIN DEFENDER 1, 4–5 (2008), available at 
http://www.buting.com/KBS-Wis-SPD-Article.pdf. 
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suggestive questioning.  Commentators have stressed that when 
the suspect is an ex-spouse or ex-partner of a concerned adult, 
that adult may be the source of the child’s report.104  Although 
jurors understand that children, particularly young children, are 
susceptible to suggestion,105 they may not be adequately sensitive 
to the suggestiveness of different types of questioning. 
The research on children’s suggestibility is vast, and 
comprehensive reviews are available.106  Research has 
documented a number of ways in which children, particularly 
young children, can be led to make false reports: selective 
reinforcement of the desired response;107 guided visualization of 
the fictitious event;108 negative stereotyping of the suspect;109 and 
repeated suggestions from parents.110  There is also a fair amount 
 
 104.   Nicholas M.C. Bala, Mindy Mitnick, Nico Trocme & Claire Huston, 
Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental Separtion:  Smokescreen or Fire? 13 J.  
FAM. STUD. 26, 28–29, available at https://secureweb.mcgill.ca/crcf/sites 
/mcgill.ca.crcf/files/2007Sexual_Abus_Allegations_Parental_Separation.pdf; 
see also David P.H. Jones & J. Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious 
Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 30 
(1987).  
 105.   Jodi A. Quas, William C. Thompson & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Do 
Jurors “Know” What Isn’t So About Child Witnesses?, 29 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 
425, 440 (2005). 
 106.   Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children’s 
Memory, 50 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 419, 434–36 (1999), available at 
http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~doneill/cogsci600/Kenyon.pdf; see also Gail S. 
Goodman & Annika Melinder, Child Witness Research and Forensic 
Interviews of Young Children: A Review, 12 THE BRIT. PSYCHOL. SOC’Y 1, 9–10 
(2007). 
 107.   Sena Garven, Majes M. Wood, Roy S. Malpass & John S. Shaw, 
More Than Suggestion, The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the 
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354 (1998); see also 
Sena Garven, James M. Wood & Roy S. Malpass, Allegations of Wrongdoing, 
The Effects of Reinforcement on Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 
85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 45 (2000). 
 108.   Stephen J. Ceci, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Michelle D. Leichtman & 
Maggie Bruck, The Possible Role of Source Misattributions in the Creation of 
False Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 INT’L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
HYPNOSIS 304, 315 (1994), available at http://www.shoreline.edu/dchris 
/psych209/Documents/Ceci%20and%20 Loftus.pdf. 
 109.   Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes 
and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 
572 (1995), available at http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~rakison/leichtman.pdf. 
 110.   Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness 
Reports After Exposure to Misinformation from Parents, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CHILD PSYCHOL. 129, 147 (1995); see also Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen 
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of research demonstrating children’s susceptibility to explicit 
coaching to make false claims.111 
For the defense, it should be of interest to determine what 
disclosure recipients have said to the child.  This may reveal 
biases of the recipients and sources of influence.  Furthermore, the 
defense is likely to question the child about different disclosures, 
including: the initial disclosure, typically to a caregiver or a 
teacher; formal disclosures to law enforcement and social services; 
and disclosures to the prosecuting attorney, in order to attempt to 
show that the child’s abuse report evolved over time.  Indeed, 
practice guides provide this advice to defense attorneys 
representing child sexual abuse suspects,112 and the courts have 
been receptive to defense claims of child suggestibility.113 
B.   What Defense Attorneys Actually Do in Court 
In the study we described above, in which we examined the 
courtroom testimony of seventy-two six- to sixteen-year-old 
children in child sexual abuse criminal trials, we found that 
children were asked questions about their disclosures of abuse in 
all cases.114  First, we examined when and how often children 
were asked about specific recipients.  Virtually all (88%) of the 
questions were about specific recipients, and most of these 
involved disclosures to the child’s mother or a police officer.115  On 
average, children were asked about five different recipients.116  
Defense attorneys were more likely than prosecutors to ask about 
specific recipients, but 85% of prosecutors’ questions were 
nevertheless specific.117  Defense attorneys also asked about more 
recipients on average than prosecutors, but even prosecutors 
 
Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness Reports After Exposure to Misinformation 
From Parents, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27, 49 (2001). 
 111.   Thomas D. Lyon, Lindsay C. Malloy, Jodi A. Quas & Victoria A. 
Talwar, Coaching, Truth Induction, and Young Maltreated Children’s False 
Allegations and False Denials, 79 CHILD DEV. 914, 927–28 (2008); see also 
Jodi A. Quas, Elizabeth L. Davis, Gail S. Goodman & John E. B. Meyers, 
Repeated Questions, Deception, and Children’s True and False Reports of 
Body Touch, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 60, 64–65 (2007). 
 112.  Stilling, supra note 103, at 4–5.  
 113.  Myers, supra note 22, at 944–45. 
 114.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at 2, 10. 
 115.  Id. at 6. 
 116.  Id. at 7. 
 117.  Id. 
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asked about an average of three different disclosure recipients.118 
We then examined specifically how attorneys’ questions 
referenced disclosure content and individual disclosure 
conversations.  We found that most of the questions were general 
(i.e., they referred to disclosing abuse generally), but nevertheless 
in 80% of the trials children were asked at least one question 
about specific content, and prosecutors and defense attorneys were 
equally likely to do so.119  Similarly, in 80% of the trials children 
were asked about a specific disclosure conversation, and, again, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys were equally likely to ask these 
types of questions.120 
Defense attorneys differed from prosecutors in a couple of 
respects.  They asked more questions about specific content, and 
more questions in which they referenced both specific content and 
a specific conversation.121  Indeed, they were twice as likely as 
prosecutors to ask about specific content within a specific 
conversation (e.g., “Did you tell [your father] when he came into 
your room at Thanksgiving, that the suspect dragged you out of 
your room?”), asking this type of question in 60% of the trials.122 
The fact that child witnesses were asked a large number of 
specific questions about their prior disclosures calls into question 
children’s abilities to remember what they previously discussed.  
Compounding the problem is that there are routinely substantial 
delays between children’s disclosures and their trial testimony;123 
the average delay in the present sample was eight months 
between charges being filed and the start of the trial. 
There are several respects in which children’s memory for 
conversations is likely to be limited.  First, when children are 
asked about specific disclosure recipients, details, and disclosure 
conversations, they may exhibit some confusion regarding what 
was said to whom and when.  Distinguishing among different 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 5–6. 
 120.  Id. at 5. 
 121.  Id. at 5–6. 
 122.  Id. at 6. 
 123.  Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P.H. Jones, Patricia 
England, Linda K. Port, Leslie Rudy & Lydia Prado, Testifying in Criminal 
Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS 
SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 19 (1992); see also ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 93 
(1993). 
LYON_AND_STOLZENBERG_FINALWORD_UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/14  11:32 AM 
434 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:411 
conversations requires source monitoring, which exhibits large 
developmental changes.124 Because children have multiple 
disclosure conversations, questions about individual conversations 
present difficulties analogous to those encountered by children 
when attempting to recall a single instance of a repeated event.125   
Second, children may have difficulty in distinguishing 
between what they said and what their conversational partner 
said, another type of source monitoring.  Research examining 
adults’ ability to remember their conversations with children has 
found that adults have difficulty recalling how information was 
elicited, whether statements were spontaneous or prompted, and 
who uttered specific utterances.126  We are not aware of any 
research examining children’s abilities to identify the speaker in 
prior conversations.  Third, children may confuse what they 
thought about disclosing with what they actually disclosed, a type 
of reality monitoring.127 
The prosecutors’ rationale for asking specific questions about 
prior disclosures is unclear. As we discussed above, the child’s 
disclosures to others may be admissible hearsay corroborating 
abuse, but if so, it is equally permissible to elicit information 
about the disclosure from adult recipients as from the child him or 
herself.  By eliciting the information from the child (rather than 
the adult recipients), the prosecutor increases the risk that the 
child will be subject to difficult questions about the specifics of 
each disclosure, inconsistencies across the disclosures, and 
implications of coaching and influence that the child witness may 
 
 124.   D. Stephen Lindsay, Marcia K. Johnson & Paul Kwon, 
Developmental Changes in Memory Source Monitoring, 52 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CHILD PSYCHOL. 297, 314 (1991). 
 125.   Kim P. Roberts, Martine B. Powell, Describing Individual Incidents 
of Sexual Abuse: A Review of Research on the Effects of Multiple Sources of 
Information on Children’s Reports, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1643, 1651–52 
(2001). 
 126.   Maggie Bruck, Emmett Francoeur & Stephen J. Ceci, The Accuracy 
of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations with their Preschool Children, 5 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89, 103 (1999); see also Amye R. Warren & 
Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do 
Interviewers Recall their Interviews with Children?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
LAW 355, 365–66 (1999).  
 127.  Mary Ann Foley, Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Age-Related 
Changes in Confusion Between Memories for Thoughts and Memories for 
Speech, 54 CHILD DEV. 51, 58 (1983).  
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be ill-equipped to rebut. 
C.  Overt vs. Subtle Allegations of Influence by the Disclosure 
Recipient 
In some foreign jurisdictions, defense attorneys are expected 
to directly state their position to the prosecuting witness in cross-
examination.128  Zajac and her colleagues have shown in a series 
of studies that children (and adults) will often change their stories 
if they are directly challenged by cross-examination.129  In our 
study of court transcripts, in contrast, we found that defense 
attorneys overtly asked the child whether others had influenced 
the story in only 21% of the cases (prosecutors did so in 26%).130  
The lack of overt accusations raises a different potential problem; 
attorneys may be attempting to discredit children in subtle ways.  
Indeed, practice guides have suggested that attorneys should 
merely imply that the child witness is lying or that the child’s 
story is the product of influence.131 
Adult witnesses are likely to understand a number of aspects 
of the trial process.  First, they understand that when they testify, 
the jury or the judge will be assessing their credibility.  Second, 
they recognize that the job of the attorney who called them to the 
stand is to support their credibility (unless they are called as a 
hostile witness), and that the job of the cross-examiner is to 
undermine their credibility.  Third, they likely recognize that the 
cross-examiner will challenge their credibility indirectly.  They 
will listen carefully to each question in order to assess where the 
questions might lead, and to recognize what the cross-examiner is 
implying.  Nevertheless, adult witnesses are likely to frequently 
succumb to clever cross-examiners.132  In turn, child witnesses are 
 
 128.  Hanna, supra note 12, at 541.  
 129.  Zajac et al., Asked and Answered, supra note 12, at 206; Zajac & 
Hayne, I Don’t Think That is Really What Happened, supra note 16, at 191–
93; Zajac & Hayne, The Negative Effect of Cross-Examination, supra note 11, 
at 9.  
 130.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19, at Table 3. 
 131.  John E.B. Myers, Paint the Child into Your Corner, 10 FAM. AVOC. 
41, 43 (1987–1988). 
 132.  FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (1903), 
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/40781/40781-h/40781-h.htm#Page 
_23 (“If . . . the counsel's manner is courteous and conciliatory, the witness 
will soon lose the fear all witnesses have of the cross-examiner, and can 
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almost surely more susceptible. 
There are a number of ways in which defense attorneys could 
subtly suggest that children’s reports are the product of adult 
influence.  Simply asking a child about the number of people who 
have spoken to the child about abuse implies influence.  Similarly, 
asking the child about any treats, toys, or games involving 
disclosure recipients suggests contingent reinforcement.  Asking 
whether various interviewers “helped” the child remember can 
take advantage of the child’s positive view of both adult authority 
figures (including parents, teachers, and police officers) and the 
virtues of adult assistance. 
For example, in one California case,133 the defense attorney 
asked the twelve-year-old child witness about the prosecutor’s 
preparatory interview:  “Did Mr. Zuniga remind you what you had 
told the police officer earlier?”134  The child answered “yes.”135  The 
judge interceded (a rare occurrence), and said: “Wait, just a 
second.  Did Mr. Zuniga go over any report or did he tell you what 
happened or did you tell him what happened?”136  The child 
responded, “I told him what happened.”137  The judge recognized 
the implication of the defense attorney’s question, that the 
prosecutor had coached the child.138  The judge’s question, in turn, 
allowed the child to respond in such a way that nothing negative 
was implied.  Indeed, the judge’s question could be criticized 
because it assumed that the choices (the interviewer reminded the 
child and the child told the interviewer) were mutually exclusive.  
The extent to which the child understood the purpose of either the 
defense attorney or the judge’s question is unclear. 
The extent to which children understand strategic cross-
examination is a promising area for future developmental 
research.  In addition to the aspects of the witness role that adults 
are likely to understand, noted above, other relevant concepts are 
 
almost imperceptibly be induced to enter into a discussion of his testimony in 
a fair-minded spirit, which, if the cross-examiner is clever, will soon disclose 
the weak points in the testimony.”).  
 133.  Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, People v. Cedillos, No. 131880 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with author). 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id.. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See id. 
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also likely to undergo substantial change throughout the preschool 
and elementary school years.  First, to what extent do children 
understand that the biases of a questioner and the types of 
questions that are asked influence reports and can ultimately 
taint memory?139 Second, when do children understand the 
process by which one person determines whether another person 
is telling the truth, as opposed to succumbing to the pressures of a 
questioner?140  A child with these types of understanding can 
appreciate that when a cross-examiner elicits the fact that a 
disclosure recipient believed that abuse occurred, or asked 
questions suggesting that abuse occurred, a jury is less likely to 
believe the child. 
A third important question concerns children’s ability to 
understand cross-examiners’ questions that are designed to imply 
one thing to the witness and another thing to the fact-finder. 
Consider the attorney’s question “did the nice policeman help you 
remember?”  Young children are likely to have a positive 
perception of policemen and of how they can help. They are 
unlikely to recognize the possibility that the attorney can be 
implying something quite different, such as insinuating that the 
policeman was not so nice and not so helpful.  Children can 
respond to implied messages at a very young age, in particular 
indirect requests (e.g., “can you pass the salt?”).141  However, 
 
 139.  Kamala London, Maggie Bruck, Debra Ann Poole & Laura Melnyk, 
The Development of Metasuggestibility in Children, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 146, 151 (2011); see also Michael Siegal, Lorraine J. Waters & 
Leigh Simon Dinwiddy, Misleading Children: Causal Attributions for 
Inconsistency Under Repeated Questioning, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD 
PSYCHOL. 438, 453 (1988). 
 140.  This kind of research is analogous to research examining children’s 
appreciation of the process by which lies are detected, such as a study in 
which children understood that eye gaze aversion is believed to be 
inconsistent with sincerity.  Alejo Freire, Michelle Eskritt & Kang Lee, Are 
Eyes Windows to a Deceiver’s Soul? Children’s Use of Another’s Eye Gaze Cues 
in a Deceptive Situation, 40 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1093, 1098 (2004); see also 
Anjanie McCarthy & Kang Lee, Children’s Knowledge of Deceptive Gaze Cues 
and its Relation to their Actual Lying Behavior, 103 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD 
PSYCHOL. 117, 114 (2009).  
 141.  Marilyn Shatz, On the Development of Communicative 
Understandings: An Early Strategy for Interpreting and Responding to 
Messages, 10 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 271, 294 (1978); see also Marylyn Shatz, 
Children’s Comprehensions of their Mothers’ Question-Directives, 5 J. CHILD 
LANGUAGE 39, 45 (1977).  
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children’s conscious recognition of the distinction between literal 
meaning and implied meaning develops over time.142  A related 
line of research concerns children’s understanding of referential 
ambiguity, and shows that if an interpretation of an ambiguous 
statement is readily available, young children will latch onto that 
interpretation and fail to recognize the ambiguity of the 
statement, let alone recognize a secondary interpretation.143 
 
V.  LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY QUESTIONS ABOUT 
CONVERSATIONS:  ASK VS. TELL 
Even if attorneys could be compelled to ask facially simple 
questions, children’s limited language skills could still lead to 
misunderstanding.  In the context of conversations, one potential 
for confusion concerns the verbs that we use to describe different 
kinds of statements.  In this section, we will focus on the words 
“ask” and “tell.”  When one is seeking information, one “asks,” and 
when one provides information, one “tells.”  When one is seeking 
permission, one “asks,” and when one commands, one “tells.”  
Children’s understanding of these distinctions can affect how they 
talk about their disclosures of abuse and their interactions with 
suspects. 
A.  Did Your Mother Ask You or Tell You What Happened? 
In California v. Ortega, a case tried in Los Angeles County, 
the defense attorney argued that the five-year-old child’s abuse 
allegations against her uncle were the result of coaching by the 
child’s mother.144 On cross-examination of the forensic 
interviewer, he asked: “Now, if . . . the child says to you that 
someone told me to say that I was touching that person, you know, 
 
 142.  Carol R. Beal & John H. Flavell, Development of the Ability to 
Distinguish Communicative Intention and Literal Message Meaning, 55 
CHILD DEV. 920, 927 (1984); see also Gary Bonitatibus, Comprehension 
Monitoring and the Apprehension of Literal Meaning, 59 CHILD DEV. 60, 68 
(1988). 
 143.  Beal & Flavell, supra note 142, at 926–27; see also Elizabeth S. 
Nilsen & Susan A. Graham, The Development of Preschoolers’ Appreciation of 
Communicative Ambiguity, 83 CHILD DEV. 1400, 1411 (2012).  
 144.  Reporters’ Partial Trial Transcript at 32, People v. Ortega, No. 
PA064937-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16–17, 2010) (on file with author). 
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that he was touching my private parts, a number of times, 
wouldn’t you follow up on that?”145  The attorney was referring to 
several points during the interview when the child appeared to 
disclose that the mother had told her that she had been abused.  
For example, the child reported that after the alleged abuse 
occurred, “And then we get home and my mom says, ‘Come here.’ 
And we go to our room and she tells me all what happened when 
he was touching my private parts.”  Fortunately for the 
prosecution, the interviewer had followed up.  She asked “what do 
you mean that your mom told you all what happened” and “what 
exactly did your mom say to you?”  The child explained: “She said, 
“What happened?” And I said, “My uncle was touching my private 
parts and it hurt.”146  The case hints that the child was simply 
confusing the words “ask” and “tell”—she should have said “she 
asks me all what happened” instead of “she tells me all what 
happened”—which highlights the significance of simple linguistic 
confusion in understanding children’s testimony.147 
Unlike many of the developmental questions discussed thus 
far in this paper, there is a surprisingly large literature on 
children’s ability to distinguish between the words “ask” and “tell,” 
most of it inspired by work on grammatical development 
conducted by Carol Chomsky in the late 1960s.148  Furthermore, 
Anne Graffam Walker, a forensic linguist, brought the potential 
difficulties to the attention of legal professionals through 
groundbreaking writings that introduced lawyers to linguistic 
 
 145.  Id. at 37.  
 146.  See Transcript of Forensic Interview, People v. Ortega (Cal. Super. 
Ct. July 1, 2009) (No. PA064937-01). 
 147.  See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, People v. Lomeli (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 
1998) (No. 126866)  (Jessica, a ten-year-old, stated:  “first my mom called the 
police station, and then they came to our house, and they told me ‘what he 
did’”); see also Transcript of Trial, People v. Vasquez, No. 148877 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 5, 2001) (Natalie, an eight-year-old was interviewed by the defense 
attorney:  “Q:  Okay.  And what did he do with the pencil, anything?  A: He 
just like put it like on top and then put it inside and then he just told me if he 
put it on top or inside.”).  In Vasquez, however, the defense attorney pushed 
his luck, and followed up with:  “So he was telling you what had happened; is 
that right?”  At this point, the child recognized the negative implication, and 
responded “No.  He was asking me if he put it inside or me or on top of me 
and was using the pencil to pretend that’s his private part.”  Id. 
 148.  See generally CAROL CHOMSKY, THE ACQUISITION OF SYNTAX IN 
CHILDREN FROM 5 TO 10 (1969). 
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development.149  Specifically, Walker warned that “the meaning 
difference” for ask/tell “is often not sorted out by children until 
they are anywhere from 7 to 10.”150 
However, perusal of the ask/tell research highlights the 
potential difficulties in applying research in language 
development to children’s testimony.  First, Chomsky’s findings 
sparked a great deal of research in large part because many 
researchers challenged her conclusions.  Second, Chomsky was 
primarily interested in how specific grammatical forms could be 
misconstrued by children, rather than how well children 
understand the words “ask” and “tell” more generally.151  That is, 
Chomsky’s findings highlighted the fact that whether children 
appear to understand “ask” and “tell” can be highly context-
dependent.152  Hence, in applying the research on ask/tell to 
children’s testimony, it is useful to consider how attorneys use the 
words, and how children understand those specific uses. 
Chomsky tested how children responded when told to “ask” or 
“tell” another child.153  She found confusion in response to a 
specific type of sentence among children up to ten years of age, 
and confusion across sentences among children up to six years of 
age.154  Chomsky found that children had the greatest difficulty in 
distinguishing between “ask” and “tell” in sentences such as 
“ask/tell Laura what to feed the doll.”155  These sentences 
combined wh- clauses (e.g. “what. . .”), complement verbs (e.g. “to 
feed”), and missing subjects (i.e., the sentence does not specify who 
should feed the doll).  Note that if one “tells” Laura what to feed 
the doll, then Laura should do the feeding, but if one “asks” Laura 
what to feed the doll, then one should do the feeding.  However, in 
both ask and tell versions of the sentence, children assumed that 
Laura was the person who should feed the doll.156  This difficulty 
persisted among even the oldest children Chomsky tested (ten-
year-olds) and she noted anecdotally that these sentences were 
 
 149.  Ann Graffam Walker, Handbook on Questioning Children: A 
Linguistic Perspective, 2 ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 29 (1999).  
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See generally CHOMSKY, supra note 148. 
 152.  See generally id.  
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id.   
 155.  See generally id. at 101. 
 156.  Id.  
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even difficult for adults.157 Other sentences, however, were 
problematic only for the five- and six-year-olds, such as “ask/tell 
Laura what this is” (wh- clause, subject supplied) or “ask/tell 
Laura your last name” (noun phrase).158  The younger children 
always responded by telling rather than asking.159 
Subsequent work criticized Chomsky’s findings.  Both Warden 
and Tanz argued that children ignore the exact wording used by 
experimenters and instead attempt to infer what the experimenter 
wants; in other words, they interpret the statements 
pragmatically.160 Warden found that four- to five-year-olds 
responded to both “ask” and “tell” sentences as if they should 
ask.161  Hence, when told to “tell [the other child] your last name,” 
children asked the other child “what is my last name?”162  Warden 
argued that children assumed that the purpose of the game was to 
engage the other child in a conversation, and questions operated 
to spark the other child’s interest.163  Hence, whether they were 
told to ask or tell, they asked.  Warden argued that the pragmatics 
of Chomsky’s task led children to assume that the adult wanted 
them to tell the other child what that child should do with the 
doll.164  Similarly, Tanz showed that five- to nine-year-old children 
interpreted “ask” sentences about the rules of a game (e.g. “ask 
Rachel where to put the red cards”) in light of their knowledge or 
ignorance; if they were ignorant of the rules of the game, they 
asked, but when they knew the rules of the game, they told.165 
Importantly, these studies did not deny that children had 
difficulty in responding correctly to statements using “ask” and 
“tell,” but rather they disagreed with Chomsky regarding the 
reasons for children’s difficulty.166  Chomsky argued the difficulty 
 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 45.   
 159.  See id. 
 160.  See Christine Tanz, Asking Children to Ask; An Experimental 
Investigation of the Pragmatics of Relayed Questions, 10 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 
187, 193–94 (1983); David Warden, Children’s Understanding of Ask and 
Tell, 8 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 139,145 (1981).  
 161.  Warden, supra note 160, at 143–44. 
 162.  See id. at 145. 
 163.  See id. 
 164.  See id.  
 165.  Tanz, supra note 160, at 192.  
 166.  Id. at 190; Warden, supra note 160, at 144. 
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was attributable to grammar, whereas Warden and Tanz argued 
the difficulty was due to pragmatics.167  For our purposes, 
however, the studies failed to resolve an important question:  is it 
possible to focus children’s attention on the words themselves 
(rather than their pragmatic assumptions about our questions), 
and, if one does so, do they understand the distinction between 
telling and asking? 
Both Chomsky and Warden devised picture tasks in order to 
avoid children’s pragmatic assumptions about how to respond to 
instructions, but their interpretation of the results only led to 
more questions.168  Chomsky found that children’s difficulties 
were reduced, but not eliminated (and a replication by Kessel 
found the same thing).169  Warden argued that his tasks showed 
good understanding among four- and five-year-olds, but Chomsky 
pointed out two problems with Warden’s tasks that likely 
exaggerated children’s apparent comprehension.170 
 
 167.  See CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 101–02; Tanz, supra note 160, at 
192–93; Warden, supra note 160, at 148–49. 
 168.  See CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 100; Warden, supra note 160, at 
146. 
 169.  CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 99–101; Frank S. Kessel, The Role of 
Syntax in Children’s Comprehension from Ages Six to Twelve, 35 
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 34–35 (1970). 
 170.  Warden, supra note 160, at 147; Carol Chomsky, ‘Ask’ and Tell’ 
Revisited:  A Reply to Warden, 9 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 667, 667 (1981) 
[hereinafter Chomsky, A Reply to Warden].  Both researchers showed 
children pictures, read them sentences, and asked them questions about the 
pictures.  Chomsky found that the difficulties of children in grades one to 
three were reduced, but not eliminated, when they were presented with pairs 
of pictures and asked to identify which picture matched an ask sentence (e.g. 
“the boy asks the girl what to wear,” comparing pictures in which the boy or 
the girl is trying on shoes).  CHOMSKY, supra note 148, at 99, 101.  Chomsky 
found that five- to seven-year-olds had difficulty when they were presented 
with single pictures, told “[name 1] asked [name 2] wh- with non-specific 
subject,” (e.g., “Susan asks Mary which tree to climb”) and then asked “which 
one is [name 1]” and “what is he saying?”).  See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden, 
supra, at 675–76. Warden found that four- to five-year-olds were 90% 
accurate when presented with single pictures, told “[name 1] asked/told 
[name 2] wh-“(e.g., “Bill is asking/telling Gordon where the cat has gone”), 
and asked “which is [name 1]/[name2]?”  Warden, supra note 160, at 147.  
Chomsky, however, criticized Warden’s stories; they did not always involve 
the more complicated wh- with non-specific subject construction, and children 
were not asked what the chosen character actually said.  Chomsky, A Reply 
to Warden, supra, at 670.  In her stories, children often chose the correct 
character as the asker, but then quoted the character as telling.  See id. at 
670–71.  Warden’s subsequent response criticized Chomsky’s picture method, 
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In sum, although Walker warned legal professionals that 
children do not understand the distinction between ask and tell 
until seven to ten years of age, the literature does not provide 
clear support for the contention that this misunderstanding will 
manifest itself in testimony.171  Chomsky argued that seven-year-
olds could handle most uses of “ask,” but had difficulty if 
presented with sentences such as “ask Laura what to feed the 
doll,” when the subject of “to feed” was unspecified.172  In contrast, 
the distinction between “tell you what happened” and “ask you 
what happened” need not present difficulties, because the 
sentence does not contain a complement verb with an ambiguous 
subject.173 
Another difficulty with the literature is the potential 
mismatch between the way in which children’s comprehension is 
tested in the laboratory and the way in which children’s use might 
be misunderstood in the legal setting.  Clearly, children are not 
provided with instructions to ask or tell in either forensic 
interviews or in court; rather, they are asked to relate 
conversations, during which they may spontaneously utter the 
words “ask” and “tell,” and they will be asked questions that 
contain the words ask and tell. 
In the legal context, and as demonstrated by the opening 
example, a child’s confusion between “asking” and “telling” could 
affect his or her characterization of interactions with disclosure 
recipients.  In particular, the child’s characterization of the 
disclosure recipient’s statements as “telling” rather than “asking” 
would suggest that the recipient’s statements influenced the 
child’s disclosure instead of inquiring about it—insinuating 
coaching or suggestive influence instead of support and interest in 
the child’s allegation.  This suggestion could interfere with the 
jurors’ understanding of the disclosure process, thus rendering it 
more difficult to understand why the child disclosed abuse and 
whether their allegation is credible.  Therefore, a more definitive 
means of assessing children’s understanding is needed to match 
 
but acknowledged the potential difficulty of the wh- with non-specific subject 
construction.  David Warden, How to Tell if Children Can Ask, 13 J. CHILD 
LANGUAGE 421, 423–26 (1986).  
 171.  Walker, supra note 149, at 29. 
 172.  See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden supra note 170, at 670. 
 173.  See id. 
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the questioning context that is used in the field. 
A further complication concerns children’s use of the terms 
“ask” and “tell” when Spanish is their first language.  In addition 
to the obvious difficulties of comprehending anything said in a 
second language, there is potential for additional confusion among 
Spanish-speaking children because “decir” can function as both 
“said,” and “told.”174  Hence a Spanish fluent child learning to 
speak English might use the word “tell” in place of “said.”  
Specifically, the child who says, “My mother told me what 
happened” may mean, “My mother said to me ‘what happened?’” 
B.  Did the Defendant Ask You or Tell You to Go with Him? 
The debate between Chomsky and her critics raised an 
important distinction between different uses of “ask” and “tell” 
that were touched upon in the beginning of this section.  Chomsky 
noted that some children may have interpreted the instruction to 
“ask” as “request politely.”175  In other words, children who were 
told to “ask Laura what to feed the doll” heard “tell Laura what to 
feed the doll in a nice way.”176  The distinction is that between 
epistemic and deontic uses of words.  “Ask” and “tell” can be used 
both epistemically and deontically.  We have been discussing the 
terms in their epistemic sense:  “ask” refers to questions seeking 
information, and “tell” refers to providing information.  “Ask” and 
“tell” can also be used deontically:  “ask” means to make a polite 
request and “tell” means to command. 
The epistemic/deontic distinction has been extensively 
discussed with respect to other terms, such as “must.”  One can 
 
 174.  Carole Edelsky & Virginia Muiña, Native Spanish Language 
Acquisition: The Effect of Age, Schooling and Context on Responses to ‘Dile’ 
and ‘Preguntale’, 4 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 453, 464 (1976) (“if the verb tell is 
used . . . the embedded clause is ambiguous out of further context in ELA 
[East Los Angeles Mexican Immigrant] English between a WH question and 
a WH statement”); Benji Wald, Spanish-English Grammatical Contact in Los 
Angeles: The Grammar of Reported Speech in the East Los Angeles English 
Contact Vernacular, 25 LINGUISTICS 53, 65–66 (1987). 
 175.  See Chomsky, A Reply to Warden supra note 170, at 677. 
 176.  See id.; see also Kessel, supra note 169, at 8, 35–36 (some children 
interpreted “ask” as a request); Walker, supra note 149, at 29 (arguing that 
children’s difficulty in understanding ask and tell might lie in the fact that 
ask can signify both a request and a polite command); Warden, supra note 
160, at 423–24 (discussing the difference between the directive and 
informative uses of “ask” and “tell”).  
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use “must” to refer to necessity in light of knowledge (a parent 
would say that the child “must” be in bed when she has searched 
everywhere else for him); this is an epistemic use of the word.  
One can also use “must” to refer to necessity in light of a command 
(a parent would say that the child “must” be in bed when she has 
ordered her to go); this is a deontic use.  Generally speaking, 
children tend to acquire the deontic meaning of words before they 
acquire their epistemic meaning, perhaps because they 
understand concepts of desire and interpersonal influence before 
they understand belief and knowledge acquisition.177 
Surprisingly, researchers have not compared children’s 
deontic and epistemic understandings of “ask” and “tell.”  
However, there is some evidence for early deontic understanding: 
Bock and Hornsby instructed three- to six-year-olds either to “ask” 
or to “tell” their partner (either an adult or child) to give them 
pieces of a puzzle they needed to complete, and found that even 
the youngest children more often used the word “please” and an 
interrogative (e.g. “can I have the plate?”) if they were in the “ask” 
condition.178 
In the deontic context, a child’s confusion between “asking” 
and “telling” could affect his or her characterization of interactions 
with suspects and others. In particular, the child’s 
characterization of the suspect’s statements as “telling” rather 
than “asking” would suggest that the suspect’s statements were 
designed to ensure that the child’s compliance were commands 
rather than requests. This could interfere with the jurors’ 
understanding of the dynamics of abuse, thus rendering it more 
difficult to understand why the child might continue to exhibit 
affection toward the suspect after abuse had occurred.  However, 
unlike the research examining the epistemic uses of “ask” and 
“tell,” there is little support in the literature for children’s deontic 
confusion. 
 
 177.  See JAN NYUTS, EPISTEMIC MODALITY, LANGUAGE, AND 
CONCEPTUALIZATION:  A COGNITIVE-PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE 232 (2001). 
 178.  J. Kathryn Bock & Mary E. Hornsby, The Development of Directives: 
How Children Ask and Tell, 8 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 151, 153, 159 (1981). 
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C.  Research on “Ask” and “Tell” in a Legal Context179 
In order to assess how confusion between “ask” and “tell” 
might affect child witnesses, we first examined how attorneys and 
child witnesses use the terms “ask” and “tell” in sexual abuse 
trials.  We analyzed one hundred cases of alleged sexual abuse 
involving child witnesses ages twelve and under.  We found over 
2,500 question-answer pairs in which either the attorney or the 
child (or both) used either “ask” or “tell.”  We found that in 83% of 
the cases, the use was ambiguous, in that one could grammatically 
substitute “tell” for “ask” or “ask” for “tell,” so that if a child did 
not distinguish between the terms, the statement could be 
misinterpreted.180  Over 70% of attorneys’ questions were yes/no 
questions, and children responded without elaboration over 75% of 
the time.  Children clarified whether they meant “ask” or “tell” in 
3% of their answers.  Further, attorneys clarified whether they 
meant “ask” or “tell” in 4% of their follow-up questions.  As a 
result, ambiguous uses of the words would usually be followed by 
a simple “yes” or “no” from the child without clarification of 
whether the attorneys’ use of “ask” and “tell” matched that of the 
child.  Hence, if children did confuse the terms, it would be 
impossible to discern the confusion most of the time that the 
terms were used. 
In our second study, we examined ninety-seven maltreated 
eight- to eleven-year-olds’ abilities to correctly use the words “ask” 
and “tell.”181  Children were read a series of interactions between 
parents and children and then were asked about what was said.  
In the scenarios, children and parents requested or gave 
information, as well as requested or commanded actions.  This 
corresponds directly with both epistemic and deontic uses for “ask” 
(epistemic: The Mommy said “When I was at work, did you play 
with the puppy?” The boy said, “Yes;” deontic: The Mommy said, 
“Now that I’m home, can we please play with the puppy?” The boy 
said “Okay”) and “tell” (epistemic: The Mommy said “When I was 
at work, did you play with the puppy?” The boy said, “Yes;” 
deontic: The Mommy said, “Now that I’m home, you must play 
 
 179.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 180.  There were 2,573 question-answer pairs where either the attorney or 
child used “ask” or “tell,” and 2,160 had grammatically ambiguous uses.    
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with the puppy.” The boy said “Okay”).  After each scenario, 
participants were asked yes/no questions about whether a speaker 
“asked” or “told.” 
We found that children showed a tendency to claim that the 
conversational partner who did the majority of the speaking (the 
first conversational partner) was both “asking” and “telling.”  
Hence, the children correctly affirmed that a person who asked for 
information or permission was asking, but they also thought that 
the person was telling.  It was only by eleven years of age that 
children started to show some understanding that a person who 
asked for information was asking and not telling, and that a 
person who commanded action was telling and not asking.  A 
surprising finding was that even the oldest children tended to 
deny that a person who answered an information question was 
“telling”; this was likely due to the fact that question respondents 
in our scenarios uttered a single word.  Children appeared to 
define “telling” by the amount of speech.  Further, children who 
also spoke Spanish performed less well than English-only 
speaking children in several respects. 
These findings suggest that children develop the ability to 
discriminate “ask” from “tell” in middle childhood, with English-
speaking children developing the ability to discriminate accurately 
by eleven-years-old for uses relating to requesting information and 
demanding action.  However, younger children and children in 
Spanish-speaking homes tend to affirm that speakers are both 
“asking” and “telling.”  The results have disturbing implications 
for how child witnesses will answer yes/no questions about asking 
and telling when questioned about their interactions with 
disclosure recipients and with suspects.  Children may endorse 
questions about disclosure recipients “telling” them information, 
when they were in fact asked.  At the same time, they may affirm 
that adults who coached them to provide information were 
“asking.”  With respect to suspects, children may endorse 
questions about suspects “telling” them to do things, when the 
suspects may have in fact made polite requests. This problem may 
mask the extent to which suspects cajole children into acquiescing 
in the abuse, which helps to explain children’s subsequent self-
blame and secrecy.  Conversely, children may affirm that suspects 
“asked” them to do things when they were in fact ordered to do so. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS 
A better understanding of how children recall and talk about 
prior conversations could assist legal professionals in 
investigating and litigating child abuse claims. Children’s 
conversations with others are forensically relevant. Children’s 
conversations with suspects can elucidate the dynamics of sexual 
abuse, because perpetrators talk to children in order to seduce 
them into acquiescing in sexual acts and in order to prevent them 
from disclosing the abuse.  Children’s conversations with others to 
whom they have disclosed abuse can elucidate the dynamics of 
sexual abuse disclosure, because others can influence children’s 
reports.  Adults may suspect abuse when none has occurred, and 
they may wish to conceal abuse that the child has honestly 
reported. 
Our analysis of court transcripts suggested that there are a 
number of problems with how attorneys question children about 
their prior conversations in court.182  Prosecutors may be missing 
opportunities to help jurors understand the dynamics of sexual 
abuse by emphasizing coercive statements made by suspects 
during the abuse, rather than seductive statements made before 
abuse is initiated or inducements to secrecy made after abuse has 
begun.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys are asking a large 
number of questions about children’s discussion of the abuse with 
others, but their questions are often exceedingly specific, asking 
about specific details of specific conversations with specific adults.  
Prosecutors typically fail to ask children either why they failed to 
disclose abuse initially or why they disclosed when they did.  Both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys ask predominantly yes/no 
questions, which suppress narrative responses from children and 
make it difficult to determine if children comprehend the 
questions (because children tend to answer yes/no questions with 
a simple “yes” or “no”). 
It is likely that children can be asked about conversations 
without taxing their developmental limitations if they are asked 
about what they have said to others (and what others have said to 
them) about various topics without expecting them to distinguish 
among repeated conversations with similar content. We 
 
 182.  Stolzenberg & Lyon, supra note 19. 
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recommend that legal professionals and others questioning 
children ask them what the suspect “said to you” about abuse 
(using the child’s words to describe abuse) and about talking to 
other people about the abuse.  In order to ask about possible 
seduction by the suspect, children can be asked “tell me about 
things you did with [the suspect] before he started touching you.”   
With respect to the disclosure of abuse, one can ask the child 
“how did people find out about” the abuse and “who did you first 
tell about” the abuse.  Children are likely to recall their first 
disclosure, and they are likely to have difficulty recalling specific 
subsequent disclosures because of the memorability of the first 
occurrence.183  The interviewer can follow up by asking the child 
to “tell me everything you said to [the disclosure recipient] about” 
the abuse, and “what did [the disclosure recipient] say” and “what 
did [the disclosure recipient] do” after the child disclosed.  In order 
to understand the child’s reasons for disclosure and non-
disclosure, the interviewer can ask “what kept you from telling 
right away” and “what made you want to tell [the disclosure 
recipient],” and “how did you feel when you told [the disclosure 
recipient]” and “what did you think when you told [the disclosure 
recipient].”  In order to inquire into external pressures and 
influences, the interviewer can ask the child what various 
potentially influential adults have said about the suspect, about 
the abuse, and about talking to others about the abuse (including 
the interviewer). Understanding children’s ability to recall 
conversations, both in general and with respect to abuse 
allegations, is a promising area for further research.  Researchers 
have called the study of memory for conversations the “orphan 
child of witness memory research.”184  We have found very little 
experimental work examining children’s memories for 
conversations.  Only a few studies have examined how children 
talk about their disclosures of abuse.185   
 
 183.  See Martine B. Powell, Donald M. Thomson, & Stephen J. Ceci, 
Children’s Memory of Recurring Events:  Is the First Event Always the Best 
Remembered? 17 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 127–46 (2003). 
 184.  Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation: 
The Orphan Child of Witness Memory Researchers, 1 HANDBOOK OF 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY 1, 3 (2007). 
 185.  Irit Hershowitz, Omer Lanes, & Michael E. Lamb, Exploring the 
Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse with Alleged Victims and Their Parents, 31 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111, 115 (2006); Lindsay C. Malloy, Sonja P. 
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The areas deserving future work include children’s memories 
for specific conversational interactions, children’s understanding 
of the ways in which others can influence one’s memory reports, 
and children’s understanding of the linguistic devices used to 
describe conversations (such as the distinctions between “ask” and 
“tell”).  This work will enable us to make clearer recommendations 




Brubacher, & Michael E. Lamb, “Because She’s One Who Listens”:  Children 
Discuss Disclosure Recipients in Forensic Interviews, 18 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 245, 246–47 (2013); SAS & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, at 81.   
